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I found a flaw in the model that I perceived is the criticalfunctioning structure that defines how the world works. That's precisely the reason I was shocked . . .. I still do not fully understand why it happened....
Alan Greenspan on the failure
of his deregulatory ideology
(October 23, 2008).'
I. INTRODUCTION
My thesis is as follows: (1) despite arguments to the contrary, corporate
theory still matters; and (2) the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank" or "the Act") 2 constitutes a new and important
"data point" in the on-going corporate theory debate. Specifically, I argue that
corporate theory-the branch of corporate law that tries to explain what corpoI
Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law. B.A., Brown University; J.D.,
University of Kansas. This paper was presented at the Chapman University School of Law Symposium, "From Wall Street to Main Street: The Future of Financial Regulation," on January 28,
2011. My thanks to all the participants for their helpful comments. My thanks also to Peter Huang
for encouraging me to submit a proposal for the symposium, and Frank Partnoy for graciously
allowing me to steal his title idea. Finally, I would also like to thank Stephen Bainbridge, Harry
Hutchinson, Lynn Stout, and David Westbrook for their helpful comments.
I
Alan Greenspan's Congressional Testimony - Prepared Statement, HERE Is THE CITY:
BUSINESS (Oct. 24, 2008), http://news.hereisthecity.com/news/businessnews/8386.cntns.
2

H.R. Res. 4173, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted).
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rations are, and how best to think about them-can be broken down into two
dominant strands: concession theory and nexus-of-contracts theory.3 Concession
theory focuses on the state-created nature of corporations and tends to presume
states have great freedom to regulate the entities they create. Nexus-of-contracts
theory, on the other hand, views the state's role in corporate law as little more
than to provide default rules to maximize the efficiency of the bundle of contracts that make up the legal fictions we call "corporations." I further argue that
these corporate theories were relevant to the outcome of the recent blockbuster
Citizens United case, wherein the Supreme Court held that campaign finance
laws could not limit corporate political speech on the basis of corporate status
alone.4 Finally, I argue that Dodd-Frank adds a new weight to the concession
theory side of the scale by codifying too-big-to-fail ("TBTF").
The Dodd-Frank Act has been referred to as "the most sweeping change
to financial regulation since the Great Depression" and a corporate governance
"game changer." 5 In this Essay, I argue that Dodd-Frank may also be a game
changer in the debate over the nature of the corporation.6 In particular, I argue
that the Act's reaffirmation of the sovereign's extensive power to regulate corporations, together with its formal recognition of TBTF, constitute significant
See Liam Sdamus O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of
the Corporation,74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201 (2006) (noting that the two "preeminent" theories of the corporation are "contract and concession").
3

4

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

The Governance Game Changer:Dealing with Dodd-Frank,AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
http://apps.americanbar.org/cle/dodd-frank/t I1ggcl.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) ("Changes in
corporate governance standards and practices occur constantly. There are few real game changers,
but Dodd-Frank is one."). But cf Steve Bradford, David Skeel on the Dodd-FrankAct, BUSINESS
LAW PROF BLOG (Jan. 25, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2011/01/davidskeel-on-the-dodd-frank-act.html (describing corporate governance provisions of Dodd-Frank as
"a very minor part of the Act").
An argument may be made that Dodd-Frank is sufficiently narrowly focused on financial
institutions so as to make it unwise to view it as having much to say about corporations generally.
Obviously (at least for the time being), I do not hold that view. Cf Erik Gerding, Executive Compensation: Less Focus on "Executive," More Focus on "Bank," THE CONGLOMERATE (Jan. 21,
2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/20 11/01/executive-compensation-less-focus-onexecutive-more-focus-on-bank.html ("Say-on-pay and other Dodd-Frank reforms ... apply to a
broad swath of non-financial firms . . . ."); Symposium, ComparativeApproaches to Systemic Risk
6

and

Resolution,

BROOKLYN

LAW

SCHOOL,

http://www.brooklaw.edu/newsandevents/events/2011/02-25-2011.aspx? (last visited Feb. 25,
2011) ("The 2008 financial crisis ... focused attention on firms, financial or otherwise, that might
be deemed 'Too Big to Fail.' That crisis led directly to the creation, under the recently enacted
Dodd-Frank Bill, of a 'Resolution Authority' for non-bank entities whose failure might create
systemic risk.").
While the difference between state and federal regulation is obviously a significant one
when it comes to discussing the theory of the corporation, for purposes of this Essay I have ignored the distinction for the most part. Cf Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906) (asserting that
corporations are subject to "dual sovereignty" of state and federal government).
8
See Dodd-Frank Act Preamble ("An Act ... to end 'too big to fail' ....
).
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negative data points vis-i-vis the currently dominant nexus-of-contracts theory
of the corporation-both from a positive and a normative perspective. Because I
believe that the debate about what constitutes the "best" theory of the corporation will continue to play a significant role (either expressly or covertly) in some
of the most important legislative and judicial decision-making we will encounter
in the near-term, I believe this aspect of Dodd-Frank deserves our attention even
though various other aspects of the Act have received far more consideration.
In Part II of this Essay, I provide a brief overview of the various theories of the corporation. Ultimately, I advance my discussion by focusing primarily on concession theory and the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.9 It is
important to note, however, that I am employing "concession theory" broadly.
In fact, for purposes of this Essay concession theory may be understood to include the theories of many who resist ceding the debate to contractarians, but
who would also balk at being labeled endorsers of concession theory as traditionally defined.'o I leave the finer distinctions among anti-contractarians to
others.
In Part III, I explain why corporate theory still matters despite assertions
by some that the debate about the theory of the firm has run its course, and arguments by others that the implications of the various theories of the corporation are too imprecise to warrant detracting our attention from more useful debates. By way of example, I argue that corporate theory was de facto dispositive
in Citizens United," one of the most significant judicial opinions in recent
memory.
In Part IV, I explain why I believe Dodd-Frank implicates corporate
theory in a significant way. First, I point out that the fact of the sovereign's
power to regulate corporations as extensively as it has in Dodd-Frank constitutes
an on-going thorn in the side of contractarians from a positive perspective.
Second, and much more importantly, I argue that Dodd-Frank's formal recognition of TBTF calls into question some of the most fundamental normative assertions of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.
In Part V, I discuss some of the possible implications of viewing DoddFrank as a potential game-changer in the on-going debate about the theory of the
firm. The question of how best to think about corporations will continue to be at
9
While there are good reasons to differentiate "theory of the firm" from "theory of the corporation," for purposes of this Essay I will be using the phrases interchangeably except where the
distinction is material. Cf Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAw 8 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1754242 ("The nexus of contracts theory is thus not really a theory of the
firm at all, but rather a theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm.").
10
Cf Stephen M. Bainbridge, CorporateDecisionmakingand the Moral Rights of Employees:
ParticipatoryManagement and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REv. 741, 777 n.237 (1998) (describing
modem day arguments that constitute "a variant on the old concession theory," but nonetheless
concluding that "[i]t has been a long time since mainstream corporate legal theory took the concession theory seriously").
'
Citizen's United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 8
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

212

[Vol. 114

the center of many of the most significant issues confronting our courts and legislatures, and anti-contractarians should be able to point to Dodd-Frank as recent
evidence of the shortcomings of the nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.
Finally, in Part VI, I provide some concluding remarks. Primarily, I note
that I am not arguing that the contractarian view of the firm has no place in discussions of corporate theory. Quite to the contrary, I believe that there are likely
many issues involving corporate law that are best viewed through the contractarian lens. Nonetheless, I do believe that certain normative assertions advanced
under the banner of contractarianism-particularly those advancing an "extreme" de-regulatory agenda-are facing new and serious challenges in the
wake of the recent financial crisis. This Essay constitutes my attempt to highlight one of those challenges: the emergence of the Dodd-Frank Corporation.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION
Corporate theory can be explained a number of different ways. One of
the ways I like to present material like this to my students is to use a "problemsolution dance." 1 2 In this case, we can start with the problem of encouraging
economic growth in light of the fact that markets consisting solely of individuals
acting independently will be limited in the growth they can produce. Enter as
the solution: "firms."13 Firms can produce greater economic growth than individuals acting alone by, among other things, leveraging the ability of certain
individuals to deal particularly well with inherent market uncertainty by giving
them control over other individuals' productive behavior. 14 This solution, however, runs into another problem: Since there is a possibility that investors in a
business for profit may be deemed partners (and therefore personally liable for
the debts incurred by the enterprise), the capital-raising necessary to fuel firms
See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, The "Problem-Solution"Dance of CorporateLaw, BUSINESS
LAW PROF BLOG (July 15, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2010/07/theproblemsolution-dance-of-corporate-law.html. See also Stephen Bainbridge, Did Bad Corporate
Governance cause the Financial Crisis?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 15, 2010),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/07/did-bad-corporategovemance-cause-the-financial-crisis.htm (describing my July 15 post as a "problem/solution
dialogue").
13
See CHARLES R. T. O'KELLEY, THE THEORY OF THE FIRM: THE CORPORATION AS SOLE12

PROPRIETOR

SURROGATE

14

(2011),

available

at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1858936 ("The firm can then be pictured as a
circle within which are the employer and the firm's employees.").
14
See id. at 8 ("[Frank] Knight's central insight was that when uncertainty is abstracted away,
there is no need for a firm . . . even when division and specialization of labor are present ....
Knight also asserted the converse point: when uncertainty is present, the existence of . .. the firm
naturally follows." (relying on FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921))); see
also id. at 11 ("[F]irms arise when the costs of using the price mechanism increase to the point
where production can be coordinated at less expense via contracts with factors of production
which give the entrepreneur, within limits, the right to direct production." (citing Ronald H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937))).
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will be limited.15 The solution to this problem then comes in the form of separating ownership from control, thereby allowing for ownership stakes with limited
liability (i.e., the personal liability of the equity investors will be limited to the
amount invested).1 6 The original device for separating ownership from control is
the corporation.' 7 However, the separation of ownership and control inherent in
the corporate form creates its own problems, including the agency problem of
competing interests of owners and managers.' 8 It is at this point that we can start
talking more specifically about theories of the corporation because those theories can be seen as ways of providing different solutions to the agency problem-as well as all sorts of other legal problems involving corporations-with
the theories generally aligning themselves with either a pro-market or proregulatory approach.
Corporate theory has been described as offering "competing stories
about how and why corporations originate and how they operate." 9 The theories can be presented both in positive (i.e., describing what the corporation is)
and normative (i.e., describing what way of thinking about corporations leads to
the most efficient results) terms. 20 In addition, the theories can be described in
terms of their discrete labels as well as their competing themes. J.W. Verret
notes that some of the most commonly discussed discrete theories of the corporation include21: (1) agency and contractarian thought; 22 (2) shareholder prima's
Cf Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the
Limited Liability of CorporateShareholders, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1398 (1992) (stating that
"unlimited liability is the popularly perceived natural state for equity owners").
16
See Thomas C. Folsom, Evaluating Supernatural Law: An Inquiry into the Health of Nations (The Restatement of the Obvious, PartII), 21 REGENT U. L. REv. 105, 148 (2008) ("Limited
liability entities are based on the moral intuition of nonagency because there is separation of ownership from control.").
17
See Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 161, 170 (2010) ("The basic separation of ownership and control inherent in the
corporate form enabled corporations to secure widespread public investment."). See generally
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 999, 1009
(2010) ("Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate theory because
the aggregate view of corporations tended to reduce the distinction between the corporation and its
members or shareholders, which is at the heart of limited liability.").
18
See J.W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice,
27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315 (2010) ("Where the providers of capital to an enterprise, the shareholder principals, and the users of that capital, the managerial agents, are both utility maximizers,
there is reason to believe that the agents' interests can conflict with their principals' interests."
(citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and OwnershipStructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976))).
19
Thomas W. Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in CorporateLegal Theory, MICH. ST. L.

REv. 1091, 1091 (2009).
20
Cf HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION ix

(1995) (rejecting arguments based on the sovereign's ability to regulate corporations because "this
argument is simply a statement about current law, not a normative argument about what the law
ought to be").
21
See Verret, supra note 18, at 315.
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cy; 2 3 (3) director primacy; 24 (4) team-production theory; 25 and (5) progressive
corporate law.26 For purposes of this Essay, we will be focusing on contractarian
thought and progressive corporate law, with a bit of director primacy thrown in.
This is so because I equate progressive corporate law with concession theory
broadly defined, 27 and these two theories-contract and concession-have been
deemed by at least one scholar as the "preeminent" theories of the corporation.28
Furthermore, as will be explained in more detail below, my analysis of the recent Citizens United decision arguably confirms that it is precisely these two
theories that still take center-stage when competing visions of the corporation
collide. To that end, it is worth noting that contractarian thought, "also known as
the nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation, is predicated on the notion that
a corporation is a product of bargained agreements. The contractarian model of
corporate law supports the use of default rules that shareholders, companies, and
constituencies are free to modify by contract." 2 9 Progressive corporate law, on
the other hand, "takes issue with the very premise of the contractarian model"
and relies on judges and regulators to "conform corporate law to the shifting
cultural and social norms of the time." 30 Director primacy, meanwhile, holds
that "the maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate duty of directors," but modifies the traditional shareholder primacy view (which pursues that
goal by empowering shareholders) by arguing that "resting authority over corporate decisions with a self-sustaining board of directors is the best way to accomplish that objective." 3 1 The reason I am including director primacy as part of

Id. at 317.
Id. at 318 (noting that shareholder primacy theory focuses on "designing ways to assist
shareholders in exerting control through their powers, including the power to vote at annual meetings"). See also Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1023, n.132 (citing Adolph Berle as "the prime
intellect behind the shareholder primacy doctrine in the 1930s"). See generally ADOLF A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
24
Verret, supra note 18, at 321.
25
Id. at 322 (noting that team production theory "relies on contractarian thinking, but abandons notions of shareholder primacy" and "is a stakeholder-focused theory that is partly aligned
with the progressive corporate law view, and partly with director primacy, but is coterminous with
neither").
26
Id. at 324-25.
22

23

While admittedly not a perfect fit, Verret's "progressive corporate law" provides the only
home for concession theory given the options he provides. Cf ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD
A. BOOTH, CORPORATIONS: BLACK LETTER OUTLINES 327-32 (West, 5th ed. 2006) (citing entity
theory, concession theory, contract theory, nexus of contracts theory, and process theory as the
basic theoretical foundations of corporate law).
28 O'Melinn, supra note 3.
29
Verret, supra note 18, at 317.
30
Id. at 324-25 (citing William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation,87 Nw. U. L. REv. 180, 214 (1992)).
31
Verret, supra note 18, at 321.
27
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our focused discussion will be made clear when I discuss the aggregate and entity (real and artificial) theories of the corporation next.
The final piece of the discrete corporate theory puzzle that must be put
in place before moving on involves the rhetoric of corporate theory prominent in
discussions of the Supreme Court's cases involving corporations. Reuven AviYonah describes the traditional breakdown as follows:
Th[e] theories are the aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of
the State; and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the
state, but as a separate entity controlled by its managers.3 2
One can align these theories with the corporate law theories described
previously as follows: The aggregate theory is generally understood to capture
the nexus-of-contracts view, the artificial entity theory captures concession
theory, 34 and the real entity theory arguably captures the director-primacy view
of the corporation. 3 5 The last point, about real entity theory equaling director
primacy is certainly not without controversy. For example, Stephen Bainbridge,
"the leading proponent of the director primacy view," 36 clearly views director
primacy as a form of contractarianism:
If the corporation has a nexus, however, where is it located?
The Delaware code, like the corporate law of every other state,
gives us a clear answer: the corporation's "business and affairs .
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors." Put simply, the board is the nexus.

32

Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1001.
3
Id. at 1025, n.142 ("The point that the nexus of contracts theory is a reinvention of the aggregate view has been made repeatedly.").
34
Cf id. at 1042 (noting that "[tihe artificial entity theory is discussed . . . in the [Citizens
United] dissent" when Justice Stevens asserts that "many legal scholars have long since rejected
the concession theory of the corporation" (quoting Citizens United at 949-50, 952) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
3
Cf id at 1032 ("Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no doubt due in part to the
fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because it shields management from undue interference from both shareholders and the state.").
36
Verret, supra note 18, at 321.
3
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The BoardofDirectors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1,
25 (2002) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001)). Cf Verret, supra note 18, at 287
(describing director primacy as one of the "Cain and Abel-like warring children of the agency and
nexus-of-contracts marriage," the other being shareholder primacy).
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On the other hand, precisely because the board of directors' power
comes from the state, it could also be viewed as supporting a concession theory
view of the corporation. Perhaps the best view of the real entity theory of the
corporation is that it simply represents a middle ground between the extremes of
contract and concession, or is the most accurate from a descriptive point of
view.39 However, even if the real entity theory best describes the modem corporation, that fact is of limited utility here because, as just discussed, both concession and contract theories can explain how we got to the place where director
primacy best describes the corporation and thus claim the normative high
ground when it comes to answering questions about the regulation of corporations going forward. In essence, if one believes director primacy is best because
it represents the choice of the market, then director primacy essentially boils
down to contractarianism. Conversely, if one believes director primacy is best
because it represents the state's best judgment as to how to regulate its creation,
then one is back to concession theory. Thus, since I am here focusing on the
"two preeminent theories of the corporation-contract and concession," 40 I Will
leave the finer distinctions of the real entity view to others for the time being.41
In terms of competing themes (which may provide a useful "fallback"
mode of analysis when the myriad discrete labels of corporate theory begin to
look like so many arms of a Hindu god 4 2), David Millon has described three
"dimensions" along which corporate theory has evolved 43 : (1) corporation as
separate entity versus "a mere aggregation of natural individuals without a separate existence";44 (2) corporation as "artificial creation of state law" versus "nat-

See Paramount v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) ("[D]elaware law imposes
on a board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. This broad
mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of action, including time frame,
designed to enhance corporate profitability.") (emphasis added); cf Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at
1030 (asserting that under Delaware law "a corporation is more than a 'nexus of contracts').
3
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1017 ("The real entity view was most congruent with
business realities as well as the one most suited to a corporation-state balance.").
40
O'Melinn, supra note 3.
41
I do this despite the fact that others, like Avi-Yonah, have asserted that the real entity view
is ultimately the dominant view under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence because I believe (and
will attempt to show later) that, at least as far as the recent Citizens United decision is concerned,
that view is not correct. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1032 ("As the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or shareholders changes, all three views of the
corporation emerge, submerge and then re-emerge in slightly different but fundamentally similar
forms. In the end, however, the real entity view prevails.").
42
See Hinduism 101: Why do Hindu deities have so many arms?, FULLSTOPINDIA.COM,
http://www.fullstopindia.com/2010/04/hinduism-101-why-do-hindu-deities-have-so-many-arms
(last visited Oct. 12, 2011) ("Each hand of an individual deity would hold the object or symbol
that represented their various qualities.").
43
See generally, David Millon, Theories of the Corporation,39 DuKE L.J. 201, 201 (1990).
38

4

Id.
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ural product of private initiative"; 45 and (3) corporation as public versus private
construct. 46
As just stated, while all the ways of thinking about the corporation described above can be useful, for purposes of this Essay I will be focusing on the
competing theories of concession and nexus-of-contracts. As Liam O'Melinn
has pointed out, while "[n]ot all theorists use the language of contract and concession," 47 the two "preeminent" theories of the corporation are "contract and
concession." 48 However, I should note here that to the extent some would equate
concession theory with the colonial special charter system of incorporation-I
am employing a broader understanding of the theory.49 While there was a time
in our country's history when corporations were difficult to characterize as anything other than a concession from the sovereign because the charters necessary
to create a corporation were granted on a case-by-case basis and often to serve
some specific and limited pro-social goal,50 the fact that we have since moved to
an enabling act regime" does not change the fact that individuals remain unable
to recreate the totality of the plethora of essential corporate 'attributes without
the state's permission. 52 As Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie have recently
written: "One cannot contract to form a corporation . . . . The fact that th[e]
45

Id.

46

Id.
According to one view, corporate activity has broad social and political ramifications that justify a body of corporate law that is deliberately responsive to
public interest concerns. The alternative viewpoint portrays corporate law as
governing little more than the private relations between the shareholders of
the corporation and management, which acts as their agents or trustees.

Id.
O'Melinn, supra note 3, at 201 n.3.
Id. at 201. Cf id. at 258 (discussing "concession theory and ... its nexus of contracts counterpart").
49
Cf BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20 ("[Concession] theory had its origins in the early
history of the corporation, when corporations were, in fact, created by special charter. The theory
has no relevance today, when corporations are freely formed by making a simple filing under
general corporation laws.").
5o
See Stefan J. Padfield, In Search of a Higher Standard: Rethinking Fiduciary Duties of
Directors of Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries, 10 FORDHAM J.CORP. & FIN. L. 79, 87 (2004) ("[I]n the
colonial United States, the responsibility for granting charters fell to the legislature. These charters
were initially granted primarily to further various public works projects and, like in England, were
handed out on a case-by-case basis.").
5
See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 27, at 329 ("The process of incorporation today involves only ministerial acts and no significant substantive decisions are made in this process by
the state or agency that issues charters to corporations.").
52
Cf Padfield,supra note 50, at 89 ("It is important to note here (and should be obvious upon
reflection) that the State did not grant limited liability to shareholders or immortality to the corporate entity merely out of a benevolent desire solely to increase the wealth of shareholders. Rather,
the State saw that its interests as sovereign, whether building specific pieces of infrastructure or
promoting economic growth generally, could be furthered via the corporate form.").
47

48
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permission [to incorporate] is readily granted . . . does not change the fact that

permission is required." 53 Add to that the ubiquity of reserve clauses in corporate codes, 54 the existence of stakeholder statutes,55 and relatively recent judicial
pronouncements that "[c]orporations are creatures of the Legislature .

.

. [i]t is

appropriate, therefore, that the terms and conditions of their existence be determined by that body,"s 6 and I would go so far as to label the argument that concession theory is necessarily tied to our special charter era a straw man.57
Perhaps the best way to think about the version of concession theory I
am advancing here is to align it with the state-conferred benefits argument often
made in order to support increased regulation of corporations. David Yosifon
has noted that in the campaign finance area:
Perhaps the most commonly heard justification for why corporate political speech can be restricted is that corporations are artificial creatures of law, bestowed with favorable attributes by
the state, and can therefore be subject to regulation by the govemments that created them and made them powerful in the first
place.
Yosifon posits that this is a "tempting-but-ultimately-bad" argument, 59
at least for purposes of regulating corporate political speech. It is worth addressGrant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of the
"Nexus of Contracts" Theory, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1127, 1130 (2011) ("[E]ven at the most basic of
levels, the 'corporation as contract' claim is simply incorrect. Corporations are not creatures of
contract."). Cf Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) ("[T]he essential role of all forms of organizational law is to provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors' rights-a form of 'asset partitioning'-that could not
practicably be established otherwise.").
See Ian S. Speir, Constitutionaland Statutory Reservation Clauses and Constitutional Re54
quirements of General Laws with Respect to Corporations:The Fifty States and the District of
Columbia, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1820868 ("Reservation clauses, reserving to the
legislature a power to amend or repeal corporate charters, are included in the constitutions or
corporation statutes of 49 states and the District of Columbia."). Cf Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 69 (1992)
("Advocates of Contract Clause protection for shareholders are aware of the 'reserve' clauses
resulting from Dartmouth College, but they appear to underestimate the full import of these powers. States have 'reserved' the freedom . .. to 'impair' the rights of shareholders . . . .").
5
Cf Orts, supra note 54, at 48 ("Although most legal commentators greet them with a loud
hiss, this Part concludes that constituency statutes are legitimate, constitutional, and legally enforceable.").
56
Neary v. Miltronics Mfg. Servs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (D.N.H. 2008).
s7
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1557 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "straw man" as "[a] tenuous
and exaggerated counterargument that an advocate makes for the sole purpose of disproving it").
David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: CorporateSocial Re58
sponsibilityafter Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1197, 1219 (2011).
59
Id
53
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ing his reasons for that conclusion here in the hope of convincing the reader that
this view need not be universally accepted.
Yosifon provides three rationales for dismissing what I am here calling
concession theory as a basis for regulating corporate political speech. First, Yosifon points out that concession theory "flies in the face of contemporary theories of the firm, which posit that the corporation is not an entity created by the
state, but is rather a voluntary association of individuals, a nexus-ofcontracts."6 o Of course, this is correct as far as it goes. However, my argument
here is precisely that the dominance of the contractarian view of the firm is ripe
for challenge, that a revitalized concession theory may well be one of its prime
challengers, and that Dodd-Frank provides us with a new premise upon which to
base the challenge.
Second, Yosifon argues that accepting the state-conferred benefits argument would create an insurmountable slippery-slope:
[I]nheritance laws ensure that heirs of large estates will retain
most of the estate's corpus, capital gains laws economically
benefit successful investors, and patent laws give investors artificially created monopolies, thereby effectively providing all
three groups with potential economic advantages in the expressive marketplace if they choose to exercise them .

. .

. No one,

to our knowledge, has seriously suggested that the expressive
activity of these individuals or organizations can constitutionally be curbed as a result of their potential economic advantag-

es. 6 1

Hopefully, it should not be too hard for the reader to come up with
sound reasons for limiting the regulatory power of the state in these circumstances, while supporting regulation of corporate political speech. Particularly,
the First Amendment analysis here turns on the application of strict scrutiny,
"which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."' 62 Thus, at least in
theory all one needs to distinguish the regulation of corporate political speech in
these cases is a finding that the particular concessions granted to corporations
create a unique compelling interest favoring regulation via a narrowly drawn
statute. Yosifon himself arguably provides just such an interest when he asserts
that corporations are unique in their ability to "capture" government regulators:
"[C]orporations, in general, enjoy competitive advantages over consumers and
Id. at 1220.
Id. (quoting Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Goodfor General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 284-85
(1998)).
62
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
60

61

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 8
220

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

workers in the competition for regulatory favor .

. .

[Vol. 114

. The former find it easier to

organize, agree on strategies, generate resources to be deployed in joint activity,
and exclude potential free-riders, than do the latter." 6 3 A reasonable person
could conclude that this competitive advantage flows directly from the state's
concessions of limited liability, immortality, etc.
Finally, Yosifon argues that the state-conferred benefits argument
would also permit the regulation of media and non-profit corporations in ways
that simply cannot be aligned with our understanding of the First Amendment.6 4
However, the Supreme Court has already shown the ability to carve out protections for non-profits in this area 65 and, at least in Citizens United, not even the
regulators themselves tried to reach media corporations, which on the textual
level at a minimum have a special place under the First Amendment.6 6
The last point to be made before moving on to the next section of this
Essay is that I essentially equate nexus-of-contracts theory with a laissez-faire
approach to corporate regulation. That is, I believe it is fair to characterize the
majority of contractarian corporate law scholars as subscribing to the general
belief that rational actors operating via the corporate form will benefit society
most if they are left relatively free to compete in open markets. This normative
assertion has frequently been advanced by viewing the corporation as a contract
that suffers primarily, if not solely, from agency problems in terms of maximizYosifon, supra note 58, at 1203.
6
Id. at 1221 ("It would be a very small version-an unfamiliar version-of the First
Amendment that would sanction the regulation of the media and political organizations on the
grounds that they enjoy the benefits of state-conferred corporate status.").
65
See Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After
Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1027, 1051 (2011).
In 1986, the Court held that the FEC may not subject a corporation to FECA's
restrictions if the corporation (1) was established for advocacy purposes, (2)
did not have shareholders with an economic disincentive to severing ties if
they disagreed with the corporation's political views, and (3) had a policy of
eschewing donations from business corporations. That exemption demonstrates that the Supreme Court does not consider the corporate form per se to
create a danger of Austin-style corruption; rather, only the business corporation poses such risks because of its unique ability to amass capital to establish
political war chests without any connection to public support for an idea or
candidate.
Id. (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-64 (1986)).
66
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 ("Media corporations are ... exempt from § 441b's
ban on corporate expenditures." (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2002))); id. at
976, n.75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If the legislature does not give media corporations an exemption, it violates the First Amendment rights of the press.").
67
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20, at viii. ("This book ... will articulate a contractual
theory of the corporation . . . . Acceptance of this analysis should lead to broader constitutional
protection of [corporations]."). Cf Stefan J. Padfield, Another Corporate "Problem-Solution"
Dance,
BUSINESS
LAW
PROF
BLOG
(Jan.
9,
2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business law/page/19/ (paraphrasing David G. Yosifon as asserting that "[a]ll thoughtful people agree corporations should serve a pro-social purpose").
63
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ing utility-agency problems that are best solved by elevating shareholder
wealth maximization as the primary directive of corporate directors and letting
shareholders and management battle it out over the terms of their contract as
they see fit, subject only to default rules provided by the state for those situations where bargaining is too costly or simply overlooked. To the extent conducting business in the corporate form creates negative externalities, the regulatory response should be limited to generally applicable laws.68
Meanwhile, I equate concession theory with a more regulatory view. 69
That is, I believe it is fair to characterize the majority of anti-contractarian corporate law scholars as subscribing to the general belief that if left unregulated,
the amazing capital-accumulation device that is the corporation will amass so
much power as to pose a real threat to society. 70 As I have written elsewhere,
fear of the power of corporations is not new:
Almost from the time of the birth of the modern corporation
there have been many voices loudly proclaiming that the accumulation of power that the corporate vehicle promised posed a
threat to the people. As Timothy Kuhner notes, "[t]hose of us
concerned with the problem of corporations in politics can rest
assured, we are in good company." These voices include U.S.
presidents like Thomas Jefferson, who urged citizens to "crush
in it's [sic] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations
which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of
strength and bid defiance to the laws of our country"; Abraham
Lincoln, who wrote that "corporations have been enthroned and
an era of corruption in high places will follow," and predicted
that "the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong
its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all
wealth is aggregated in a few hands, and the Republic is destroyed"; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, who warned us to "guard
against the acquisition of unwarranted influence . .. by the mili-

tary-industrial complex." President Rutherford B. Hayes went
68

Cf Lucian Arye Bebehuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1486 (1992) ("Some may question
whether corporate law issues involve significant externalities; in particular, they may argue that
non-shareholder parties are well protected by bodies of law other than corporate law or by privately adopted contractual rules.").
69
Cf William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation:A Critical
Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 433 (1989) ("Commentary grounded in the Nexus of contracts concept
declares 'contract or concession' to be the political issue regarding the theory of the firm. It asserts that advocates of government regulation subscribe to a concession theory of the corporation's origin and then draws on the nexus of contracts to rebut concession theory."). .
70

Cf C. T. CARR, THE GENERAL PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 165-73 (1905)

(describing the concession theory of corporate powers as a response to fears about threats of corporate power to the sovereignty of the King).
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so far as to assert that "[t]his is a government of the people, by
the people and for the people no longer . .. It is a government of

corporations, by corporations and for corporations."And, while
perhaps not "good company" to some, Karl Marx was one of
the early thinkers who "cautioned that the concentration of
wealth in corporate hands would subjugate the law to private
control." 7I
While it is outside the scope of this Essay, it would be interesting to
survey the articles that cite the various famous quotes generally associated with
a fear of unbridled corporate power and see how often those quotes are cited
approvingly by anti-contractarians as opposed to contractarians. My expectation
is that the results would support my belief that there is a meaningful connection
between anti-contractarian corporate theory and fear of corporate power.72
III. WHY CORPORATE THEORY STILL MATTERS
There has been some suggestion that, at the very least, the debate about
the nature of the corporation has in some sense run its course. Stephen Bainbridge has noted that in terms of the debate between contractarians and noncontractarians, "the debate ... is over.... Contractarians and noncontractarians
no longer have much of interest to say to one another." 73 In addition, it has been
suggested that the debate about the nature of the corporation may be of limited
import because it is not clear that particular theories of the corporation necessarily lead to particular conclusions about how corporations should be regulated.
Stefan Padfield, Finding State Action when CorporationsGovern, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 703,
726-27 (2009) (quoting Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CAL. L.
REv. 2353, 2366 (2007)); 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 68-69 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1899); 2 EMANUEL HERTZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A NEW PORTRAIT 954-55 (1931); Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People (Jan. 17, 1961), in
at
available
1035,
1038,
PAPERS
PUB.
1960-61
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4728424.1960.001/1090 (last visited Sept. 10, 2011); JOHN
MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY
IDEA xiv (2003); Daniel T. Ostas, Deconstructing CorporateSocial Responsibility: Insightsfrom
Legal and Economic Theory, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 261, 269 (2001).
72
Anti-contractarians obviously challenge contractarian justifications of the status quo in
corporate law on other grounds than the potential for destructive accumulation of power via a
lightly regulated corporate form. See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and
CorporateLaw: A Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437 (2010) (reviewing Kent Greenfield, Corporate Law and the Rhetoric of Choice, 24 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: LAW
AND ECONOMICS: TOWARD SOCIAL JUSTICE 61 (Dana L. Gold ed., 2009) (describing Greenfield as
"reject[ing] contractarian justifications for existing corporate governance arrangements [because]
current governance arrangements entrench existing matrices of social and economic power, thus
disadvantaging corporate stakeholders who are currently excluded from the corporate decision
making process")).
7
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 31 (2002) ("[T]he debate has
been played out.").
71
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In particular, David Millon has concluded that, "Historically, the political implications of the natural/artificial and entity/aggregate distinctions have been ambiguous, meaning different things at different times."74 However, Millon is
arguably best understood as warning us about the complexities of corporate
theory's "legitimatizing function," as opposed to disputing that there is any such
function at all.75 Furthermore, recent events suggest corporate theory remains
very much an integral part of our decision-making when it comes to determining
the role of corporations in society.
In the recent case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,76
the Supreme Court struck down section 441(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197 1 as unconstitutional. The statute in question limited the political speech of corporations as compared to natural persons, 78 and the 5-4 majority essentially concluded that there was nothing about corporations qua corporations that justified the statute's identity-based restriction on speech. 7 9 Larry
Ribstein has described the case as potentially being "one of the most important
business decisions in a generation."so
As I have argued elsewhere, Citizens United can be understood as a case
where corporate theory played a dispositive role--despite protestations to the

Millon, supra note 43, at 202. See also Reuven, supra note 17, at 1022-23.
In 1926, John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he
dismisses as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and
real entity views of the corporation. These views, he explains, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he uses examples relying on the cyclical nature
of these theories. His conclusion is that theory should be abandoned for an examination of reality.
Id. (citing John Dewey, The HistoricalBackgroundof CorporateLegal Personality,35 YALE L.J.
655 (1926)). Cf Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1732910 ("[A] metaphor or philosophical conception of the corporation
is not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the Court should conduct. The Court should
consider the purpose of the constitutional right at issue and whether it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it . . . .").
7
See Millon, supra note 43, at 241 ("[P]articular theories of the corporation are perceived to
justify particular legal rules or, at a more general level, a particular approach to regulation. Although th[is] legitimation claim is a plausible interpretation . . . the connection between corporate
theory and doctrinal and social developments is, in fact, a good deal more complex. We have yet
to develop an adequate account of corporate theory's legitimating function.").
76
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
74

n
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (amending 2
U.S.C. § 441(b) (1971)).
78
Id. (prohibiting corporations (and unions) from financing "electioneering communications"
within 30 days of a primary election).
7
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 885 ("Government may not suppress political speech on
the basis of the speaker's corporate identity.").
80
Larry E. Ribstein, The Court Unleashes the Corporation, IDEOBLOG (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:22
AM) http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2010/01/the-court-unleashes-the-corporation.html.
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contrary from the dissent.8 1 To see this, one need only look at the contrasting
characterizations of the corporation by the majority and the dissent. The majority viewed the corporation as fundamentally little more than an association of
citizens. 82 The dissent, meanwhile, viewed corporations as state-created entities
that: (1) "differ from natural persons in fundamental ways";83 (2) "have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires"; 84 and (3) "must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are to maximize shareholder value." 85 Of particular note, the dissent asserted that "corporations have
been 'effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society's economic welfare.'" 8 6 As I have written previously:
By denying that there was anything more substantial to the corporation than an association of citizens, the majority could conclude that there was nothing about the corporation qua corporation that justified restricting corporate political speech solely on
the basis of corporate identity. Conversely, the dissent's view
of the corporation as "differ[ing] from natural persons in fundamental ways" arguably made it much easier to conclude that
the challenged limitations on speech survived strict scrutiny.87
Avi-Yonah argues that Citizens United is a real entity case, with both
the majority and dissenting opinions agreeing on this point while disagreeing on
its implications.88 I obviously read the opinion differently. Where Avi-Yonah
See Stefan J. Padfield, Citizens United and the Nexus-Of-Contracts Presumption, 1 HARV.
Bus. L. REv. 25 (2010), available at http://www.hblr.org/2011/01/citizens-united-and-the-nexusof-contracts-presumption/.
82
See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906-07 (asserting that the Court's prior ruling in
Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990), "permits the Government to ban
the political speech of millions of associations of citizens"); id. at 908 (asserting that, under 2
U.S.C.A. § 441(b), "certain disfavored associations of citizens-those that have taken on the
corporate form-are penalized for engaging in . . . political speech"). Note, however, that citizenship is not required to claim the protections of the First Amendment or to incorporate. Citizenship
is required, however, to claim the benefits of some of the constitutional protections corporations
currently lack. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (holding corporations not to be "citizens"
within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause). One might be forgiven for wondering whether the majority's use of the term "citizen" portends a further expansion of corporate
constitutional rights in the future.
83
Citizen's United, 130 S. Ct. at 971, n. 72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84
Id. at 972.
85
Id. at 965.
86
Id at 971 (quoting Milton Regan, Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue, in DEBATING
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 289, 302 (A. Allen & M. Regan eds.,1998)).
87
Padfield, supra note 81 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971, n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
88
Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1040 ("What is remarkable about Citizens United ... is that
both the majority and the dissent adopted the real entity view of the corporation, so that their only
81
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sees coherence, I see a battle between the concession and contractarian views of
the corporation.8 9 To begin with, much of the language from judicial opinions
that Avi-Yonah cites as examples of the aggregate (i.e., contractarian) view of
the corporation emphasizes the very same corporation-as-association-of-citizens
rhetoric employed by the majority in Citizens United.90 Avi-Yonah tries to distinguish the use of this rhetoric in Citizens United (specifically, by Justice Scalia
in his concurrence) 9' by arguing that "this does not mean that he adopted the
aggregate view, since that view, as applied to the shareholders, underlays the
principal argument of the Government and was soundly rejected by the majority. Instead, what Scalia meant was presumably corporate management working
However, this line of analysis fails
together as an association of persons ....
to distinguish between the different ways a focus on shareholders can be used in
terms of corporate theory. When the Government argues that the protection of
shareholders justifies state regulation, it is arguably doing so on the basis of a
view of the corporation much more aligned with the artificial entity view than
the aggregate view-since it is the artificial entity view, rather than the aggregate view, which favors regulatory solutions. Thus, to reject the state's argument here is to reject concession theory, not the aggregate view. 93 Meanwhile,
disagreement was in divergent assessments of the implications for the First Amendment."). But
see Larry E. Ribstein, Citizens United v. FEC: A Roundtable Discussion, FEDERALIST SOCIETY
(Feb. 3, 2010) http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.38/default.asp ("In general, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Stevens' dissent represent diametrically opposed views of the
corporation.")
89
But cf Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A CorporateLaw Analysis of Free Speech and
CorporatePersonhoodin Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 505 (2010) ("The majority in Citizens United employed both the aggregation-of-rights and entity theory of corporations to
reach its conclusion that corporate political speech is to be treated the same as individual political
speech.").
90
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1013 (quoting Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R. Co., 18 F.
385, 402-03 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883) ("[P]rivate corporations consist of an association of individuals
united for some lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their business and have
succession of membership without dissolution .

. .

. But the members do not, because of such

association, lose their right to protection, and equality of protection.")); id. (quoting Pembina
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888) ("Under the
designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations
are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose.")); id. at 1016 (quoting Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) ("[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation
is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and
with a distinct legal entity.")).
91
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he individual person's
right to speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons.").
92
Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1041.
93
Put another way, when the state argues regulation is needed to protect the interests of shareholders in these cases, it is saying that the current procedures of corporate democracy are inadequate. Cf id. at 1042 (noting dissent's focus on "the weakness of the 'procedures of corporate
democracy"' as justifying increased regulation) (quoting Citizens United 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). This is in opposition to the aggregate view. Cf
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to suggest that Justice Scalia is protective of management as the relevant association of citizens appears to be belied by his dissent in Austin, where he seemingly equates the relevant association of citizens in the corporate context with that
in many other contexts-whether governed by a discrete board of managers or
not: "Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of elections by preventing
disproportionate expression of the views of any single powerful group, your
Government has decided that the following associations of persons shall be prohibited from speaking or writing in support of any candidate:

."94

As for

the dissent, suffice it to say that, as I set forth below in more detail, I am not
alone in seeing an artificial entity (i.e., concession theory) view in its rhetoric.95
Ultimately, the different views Avi-Yonah and I hold of the Citizens United
opinion may well, if nothing else, constitute another argument for the Justices
being explicit in terms of what view of the corporation they are employing.
In light of the foregoing, it may seem odd that Justice Stevens, in dissent, would expressly disavow any role for corporate theory in deciding the
case. Wrote Justice Stevens: "Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of explicit
and implicit contracts, a mediated hierarchy of stakeholders, or any other recognized model."9 6 However, there are a number of possible explanations for this
seeming contradiction: (1) federalism concerns; 97 (2) a failure to appreciate the
significance of corporate theory;9 8 and/or (3) a desire to avoid the appearance of
Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate
Governance Analysis into FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 31 (2001) ("The
[Bellotti] Court argued that 'corporate democracy' empowers shareholders to control a corporation's spending on political matters. By treating corporate activity as the product of the individual
agreement of its shareholders, the Court invoked the logic of the aggregation theory.") (citing First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
94
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9
See infra, note 96. Compare Avi-Yonah, supra note 17, at 1043 (noting that "the dissent
takes the view that because of the special characteristics of corporations, they have more limited
First Amendment rights"), with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that "Austin referred to the structure and the advantages of corporations as 'state-conferred' in several places" while trying to distance the dissent
from that view).
96
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971, n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FRANK
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991);

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999)).

9
Padfield, supra note 87. ("As recently as 1989, the Court described corporations as 'entities
whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law.' Would the Court now turn around
and tell states what they had created? Such a pronouncement would raise issues of federalism.")
(quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987)).
98
Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 n.72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is not necessary to agree on a precise theory of the corporation to agree that corporations differ from natural
persons in fundamental ways, and that a legislature might therefore need to regulate them differently if it is human welfare that is the object of its concern.") (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End ofHistoryfor CorporateLaw, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 n.5 (2001)), with Joseph
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imposing unconstitutional conditions on incorporation. 99 Regardless, commentators recognized the central role of corporate theory in Citizens United almost
as soon as the opinion was issued. Stephen Bainbridge posted a blog entitled,
"Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens' Pernicious Version of the Concession
Theory," 0 0 and Larry Ribstein was quoted in a roundtable discussion as noting
that, "In general, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Stevens' dissent represent diametrically opposed views of the corporation."' 0
Even commentators who generally support the widely held view that
Citizens United was more about the rights of listeners than the rights of corporations, may be able to acknowledge that a reasonable basis exists for concluding
that corporate theory matters to the resolution of the opinion. To wit, Kent
Greenfield, in commenting on my earlier Citizens United piece,102 noted that
Daniel Greenwood's argument that corporations could pursue goals that no individual living human being desired (and that might in fact be harmful to human
beings) because the relevant decision-makers were legally required to follow the
dictates of a fictional shareholder,103 could implicate the question of whether
corporations should fall within that narrow class of speech restrictions justified
on the basis of identity due to "an interest in allowing governmental entities to
perform their functions." ta The Citizens United majority rejected any role for
this doctrine by baldly asserting that, "The corporate independent expenditures
F. Morrissey, A ContractarianDefense of CorporateRegulation, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus.
L. 135, 138 (2009) ("The most problematic portion of the nexus-of-contracts framework for me
has been the normative claim that many proponents of the framework have proffered: that, because the corporation can be viewed as this bundle of privately ordered contracts, regulation is
largely unnecessary and undesirable.").
99
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 ("It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the
price of those special advantages [of incorporation] the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.")
(quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
100
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens' Pernicious Version of the ConcesPM),
4:05
21,
2010,
(Jan.
PROFESSORBRAINBRIDGE.COM
Theory,
sion
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/citizens-united-v-fecstevens-pernicious-version-of-the-concession-theory.html.
101 Ribstein, supra note 88. To the extent that one agrees with my positive correlation of contractarianism and de-regulation, one may also add Timothy Kuhner to this list. See Timothy K.
Kuhner, Citizens United as NeoliberalJurisprudence: The Resurgence of Economic Theory (Jan.
7, 2011), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=1736522 (arguing that the holding in Citizens United "flow[s] directly from neoclassical economic theory, which assumes a perfect (political) market and resists government intervention aimed at correcting power imbalances and anticompetitive behavior"). Cf William K. Black, Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, (Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1729344 ("Neoclassical
theory, which dominates law & economics, is criminogenic because it assumes that control fraud
cannot exist while recommending legal policies that optimize an industry for control fraud.").
102
Email from Kent Greenfield (Nov. 9, 2010) (on file with author).
103
See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021, 1093-94 (1996).
104
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
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at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with governmental functions,
so these cases are inapposite."' 0 5 All of the foregoing suggests corporate theory
continues to have a role to play in some of the most important legal issues confronting us today. 106
Finally, as to the other challenge to the relevance of corporate theory
raised in the introductory paragraph of Part III-that the implications of the
various theories of the corporation are too imprecise to carry the weight often
placed on them by various commentators'07-I respond first by acknowledging
that I, like many other commentators, do associate nexus-of-contracts theory
with de-regulation, and concession theory with a fear of the negative consequences of de-regulation.'os More specifically, however, there are at least two
ways that the express adoption of a particular corporate theory in these cases
could be inconsequential. First, it could simply result in nothing more than
another layer of debate being added, revolving around whether the theory the
judge is expressly adopting is in fact consistent with his or her analysis and conclusion in a particular case. However, one could reasonably hope that bringing
this debate to the surface would allow commentators and advocates to better
hold judges accountable for their decisions by leaving the judges less "wiggle
room" once they have expressly aligned themselves with a particular theory,
even if the debate is on-going.
A second possible way corporate theory could be inconsequential is that
judges could in fact be convinced to "switch sides," yet nonetheless rule the
same way in a particular case. For example, one could imagine the majority
opinion in Citizens United expressly adopting the aggregate/nexus-of-contracts
theory of the corporation, being subsequently convinced that this is not the best
theory, yet nonetheless ruling against regulation in subsequent similar cases
because the particular balancing of interests still favors striking down the regulation in question even when viewing the corporation as an artificial entity/state
concession. Again, one answer to this criticism is that while the application of
legal theories is more fact specific, and therefore arguably more imprecise, than
their adoption-one would nonetheless expect the express application of a par105

Id.
While the issue of corporate personhood under the Constitution is distinguishable from
questions of corporate theory, it is also worth noting that the Vermont legislature responded to the
Citizens United opinion by considering a measure eliminating corporate personhood status. See
Christopher Ketcham, Resolution Calling to Amend the Constitution Banning Corporate Personhood Introduced in Vermont, ALTERNET (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.altemet.org/news/149620.
107
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
108 See Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation, 11
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 135, 138 (2009) ("The most problematic portion of the nexus-ofcontracts framework for me has been the normative claim that many proponents of the framework
have proffered: that, because the corporation can be viewed as this bundle of privately ordered
contracts, regulation is largely unnecessary and undesirable."); C. CARR, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 165-73 (1905) (describing the concession theory of corporate
powers as a response to fears about threats of corporate power to the sovereignty of the King).
106
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ticular corporate theory to make the legal analysis more open to useful critique
than were the application of particular legal theories left unexpressed.' 09 As
J.W. Verret has noted, the theories of corporate law "serve to illuminate corporate law debates and rarefy the opposing parties." 1 o
IV. How DODD-FRANK IMPACTS CORPORATE THEORY

In this Part, I argue that Dodd-Frank impacts corporate theory in at least
two ways. First, it reaffirms yet again that as a matter of positive law the sovereign retains a tremendous amount of power to regulate corporations-certainly
more than contractarians frequently believe should be the case. Second, it formally recognizes that corporations have evolved to the point where at least some
of them have become literally too big to fail-a disturbing state of affairs that
many concession theorists might well respond to with something along the lines
of: "We told you so."
A.

The Inconvenient Truth ofRegulatory Power

It has been said that, "theories of corporate law [must] be disputed when
they . . . fail to comport with realities of corporate law . . . ." " And while it is

also fair to say that, when it comes to the contract-concession debate, arguments
pointing to the fact of state regulatory power as supportive of concession theory
constitute "simply a statement about current law, not a normative argument
about what the law ought to be," 1 l2 it is nonetheless hard to ignore the striking
109 A further potential benefit of having judges expressly adopt particular theories of the corporation in relevant cases is that it may clarify which party has the burden of proof. For example,
under the concession theory of the corporation, more of the burden would fall on those seeking to
limit the state's ability to regulate its creations. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Though faced with a constitutional text that makes no distinction between
types of speakers, the dissent feels no necessity to provide even an isolated statement from the
founding era to the effect that corporations are not covered, but places the burden on petitioners to
bring forward statements showing that they are . . . ."), with id. at 950, n.55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given that corporations were conceived of as artificial entities and do not have the technical
capacity to 'speak,' the burden of establishing that the Framers and ratifiers understood 'the freedom of speech' to encompass corporate speech is, I believe, far heavier than the majority acknowledges.").
110 Verret, supra note 18, at 315. Cf Roger Martin, Fixing the Game: The Unintended Consequences of an Economic Theory, THE HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 27, 2011, 2:40 PM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-martin/fixing-the-game-the-unint_b_854481 .html
("The
only way we can avoid increasingly frequent stock market meltdowns-and all the pain, suffering
and economic dislocation they cause-is to explore the theories that underpin American capitalism.").
II
Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1565, 1614 (1993).
112

BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 20. But cf Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The

Uncorporationand the Unraveling of 'Nexus of Contracts' Theory 3 (Dec. 10, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1723170 ("The nexus of contracts theory has been extremely influential
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reminder of state authority over corporations embodied in Dodd-Frank."
Among other things, Dodd-Frank seeks to exert regulatory authority over some
of the most cherished aspects of corporate governance (i.e., the aspect of corporate law that regulates the internal relations of shareholders and management):
(1) "say on pay"; (2) reporting company compensation committee composition
and authority; (3) executive compensation disclosures; (4) clawbacks of executive compensation; (5) "proxy access"; and (6) additional disclosures regarding
whether the same individual holds the positions of CEO and Chairman of the
Board. 114
It is particularly interesting to note the SEC's following statement in its
release adopting its new proxy access rule:
[C]orporate governance is not merely a matter a private ordering. Rights, including shareholder rights, are artifacts of law,
and in the realm of corporate governance some rights cannot be
bargained away but rather are imposed by statute. There is
nothing novel about mandated limitations on private ordering in
corporate governance. 5
To the extent nexus-of-contracts theory is associated with an emphasis
on private ordering and de-regulation, this constitutes a fairly strong rejection of
that theory emanating from Dodd-Frank." 6
in shaping corporate law theory over the past three decades. But despite its dominance, there is
still confusion over whether the theory is a descriptive model, a normative prescription, or some
combination of both.").
113
Cf Hayden & Bodie, supra note 112, at 12. ("The corporation is not simply a nexus of
contracts. It is an organizational form with a set of state-given benefits (primarily limited liability)
along with a set of taxes and mandatory governance rules. The state plays a much larger role in
the story than contractarians have ever before allowed.").
114 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions
of DoddFrank
1
(Oct.
28,
2010)
(reviewing
relevant
sections),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698898.
"
SEC
Release No.
34-62764,
at
17
(Aug.
25,
2010),
available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf.
116 Cf id. at 22 (noting that Dodd-Frank Act Sections 971(a) and (b) "expressly
provide that the
Commission may issue rules permitting shareholders to use an issuer's proxy solicitation materials
for the purpose of nominating individuals to membership on the board of directors of the issuer").
Shortly before this Essay went to press, the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC's proxy access rule
in Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce v. SEC (No. 10-1305, July 22, 2011), concluding that "the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed ... adequately to
assess the economic effects of a new rule." Slip op. at 3. However, Gordon Smith noted that: "The
opinion is a rather limited indictment of the proxy access proposal, relying on the lack of sufficient justification. The SEC is considering its options. While it might challenge the ruling, I suspect that the agency is more likely to produce a newly justified rule in the near future." Gordon
Smith, Business Roundtable v.
SEC, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 22, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-v-sec.html (last visited Oct. 17,
2011).
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The executive compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank can also be seen
as calling into question the "rational actor" basis of the contractarian defenses of
laissez-faire corporate regulation. Christine Hurt notes in her "Regulating Compensation" article that the financial crisis can be framed as a "contracts crisis":

117

Though these various firms and individuals legally contracted to
accept risks, these risks, at least in hindsight, were unacceptable
risks, and these contracts became toxic. That the contracting
parties entered into these agreements nevertheless can be ascribed to various failures: individual decisionmaking failures,
captive gatekeepers, skewed incentives, complexity or just plain
greed.118
Thus, "[o]nce proponents of executive compensation reform were able to link
pay without performance concerns to systemic risk concerns . . . regulation was

almost inevitable."ll 9 In other words, to at least some extent contracting
failed-and it arguably failed in a very de-regulated environment. 120
None of this should be altered by the fact that Dodd-Frank may eventually be overturned or marginalized by its opponents.121 A policy shift on the
issue of whether to exercise certain regulatory powers does not change the fact
that the relevant power exists. 122
B.

Too-Big-to-Failand the Predictive Power of Concession Theory

Whatever one may think about the impact of Dodd-Frank's regulatory
scope on the contract-concession debate, the fact that Dodd-Frank has codified
TBTF seems much harder to dismiss as anything other than a game changer.123

117
Christine Hurt, Regulating Compensation 3 (Feb. 11, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1758952.
11s
Id. at 2.
119
Id. at 3.
120
Id. (noting "decades of a more laissez-faire approach to capital markets" preceding the
financial crisis).
121
See Carr,supra note 108.
122
Cf Michael Galanis, Vicious Spirals in Corporate Governance: Mandatory Rules for Systemic

(Re)Balancing? 31

OXFORD

J.

OF

LEGAL

STUDIES

327

(2011),

available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract-1757763 ("[P]ower dynamics, which are inherent in the repeated bargains
between stakeholders and the company, are prone to imbalance rather than balance by causing
cumulative increases in the relative power of stronger parties and vicious spirals of relative power
loss for weaker ones. . . . It is therefore argued that since the contractual model is inherently prone
to instability, mandatory power-balancing rules are necessary.").
123
Cf Steven Ramirez, TBTF and the $7 Trillion Question, CORPORATE JUSTICE BLOG (Feb.
27, 2011, 5:23 PM) http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/tbtf-and-7-trillion-
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As I have already noted, one does not need to read too deeply into the relevant
literature to come away from the contract-concession debate with the distinct
impression that one of the things the two sides fundamentally disagree upon is
the threat corporations pose to modem democratic society. It may even be fair
to say that contractarians often view the private corporation as a defender of
democracy against the over-reaching of government. Contractarians would essentially have us believe that if we leave the corporation as unregulated as possible, the invisible hand of free market competition will ensure the maximum
benefit for all. As Hayden and Bodie note: "The normative side of the nexus of
contracts theory relies on an extended version of the following argument: corporations are contracts; contracts reflect Pareto improvements; Pareto improvements, by their very nature, promote the good; therefore, corporations promote
the good." 124
Concession theorists and their various cohorts, on the other hand, have
long been extremely suspicious of corporations-fearing that their incredible
ability to accumulate capital, together with the limited liability of their shareholders, effective insulation of insiders from personal liability, and "immortality" make them the front-running candidate to be the next Leviathan. 12 5 In fact, a
1905 treatise described concession theory as a response to fears about threats of
corporate power to the sovereignty of the King. 126 (Of course, this debate about
who is more on "our" side-corporations or government-ignores what may
well become a more pressing problem: Who will be on our side if corporations
and government are in fact united against US?)127
question.html ("I have long argued that Dodd-Frank did not end TBTF, but instead institutionalized it.").
124
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 112, at 16. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (9th ed. 2009)
("Pareto optimality .... An economic situation in which no person can be made better off without
making someone else worse off. The term derives from the work of Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923),
an Italian economist and sociologist.").
125
Cf Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essay: Telling Stories of Shareholder Supremacy, MICH. ST. L.
REv. 1049, 1072 (2009) ("The logic of traditional social-contract-based liberalism ... suggests
that these massive sources of collective power-far wealthier and far more able to negatively
affect our individual lives than virtually any local government or even most Federal agenciesshould be just as scary as government.... If Hobbes' Leviathan was a corporate body composed
of the subjects of the state yet existing apart from it, then our modern corporations are surely
subject to the same critiques as the Leviathan itself.") (citing THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan: Or the
Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticaland Civil, in THE ENGLISH WORKS
OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY (William Molesworth, Bart. ed., London 1839)).
126
CARR, supra note 108, at 165-73.
127
See Corporatocracy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCorporatocracy (last visited
Sept. 9, 2011) ("Corporatocracy, in social theories that focus on conflicts and opposing interests
within society, denotes a system of government that serves the interest of, and may be run by,
corporations and involves ties between government and business. Where corporations, conglomerates, and/or government entities with private components, control the direction and governance of
a country, including carrying out economic planning notwithstanding the 'free market' label.").
Obviously, I recognize that this "us vs. them" rhetoric is problematic in many ways-not least of
which because both corporations and government are "us" in too many ways to count. Nonethe-
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Concession theorists should not have been surprised by the arrival of
corporate entities deemed too-big-to-fail after a prolonged period of deregulation-entities that placed the entire global financial system at risk. 12 8
Contractarians, meanwhile, were likely "shocked."1 2 9 If "theories of corporate
law [must] be disputed when they . .. fail to comport with realities of corporate
law," 30 then they must be even more vigorously challenged when their most
cherished predictions turn out to be false.131 This is a particularly important
point here because even if Dodd-Frank were to be repealed, it would be difficult
to argue that the reality of TBTF that Dodd-Frank codified would be repealed
along with it. 132
Of course, not everyone will agree that the financial crisis of 2008 was
fundamentally a result of de-regulated market failure.1 33 In fact, in anticipation

less, one need not study history long to conclude that both governments and corporations often
take actions that threaten large swaths of the citizenry for the benefit of a few.
128
See
Conclusions,
FINANCIAL
CRISIS
INQUIRY
COMMISSION,
http://www.fcic.gov/report/conclusions (last visited Sept. 18, 2011) (citing "widespread failures in
financial regulation" as one of the causes of the financial crisis); Christine Hurt, Regulating Compensation 3 (Feb. 11, 2011), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-1758952 (noting "decades of a
more laissez-faire approach to capital markets" preceding the financial crisis); Lynn A. Stout,
Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis 1 HARv. Bus. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2011),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l1874806 ("[T]he crisis was the direct, foreseeable ... consequence of the CFMA's sudden and wholesale removal of centuries-old legal constraints on speculative trading in over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives."). Cf SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK,
13 BANKERS 30 (Vintage 2011) ("The 1920s were a period of significant deregulation, as Republican administrations dismantled the system of state control developed in order to fight the First
World War.").
129

Cf Alan Greenspan's Congressional Testimony - PreparedStatement, HERE Is THE CITY:

NEWS (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://news.hereisthecity.com/news/business-news/8386.cntns
("I found a flaw in the model that I perceived is the critical functioning structure that defines how
the world works. That's precisely the reason I was shocked.... I still do not fully understand why
it happened. . . .").
130 Orts, supra note 111.
131 One of the comments I received back on an earlier version of this Essay suggested that it
was "disingenuous, at best," to argue that Dodd-Frank had anything to teach us about theories of
the corporation, since it was enacted on the basis of "interest group politics" rather than any coherent theory of the corporation. However, the intent of the drafters does not change the fact that
Dodd-Frank codified TBTF, and it is this fact that implicates corporate theory. The motivations
underlying the Act would be relevant if the drafters in fact did not believe that there was any real
systemic threat from corporations that had gotten too big to fail-but we have no evidence of that.
132 Cf Catalina Camia, GOP Moves to Repeal IRS, Wall Street Rules, USA
TODAY (Jan. 6,
2011), available at http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/201 1/01/gop-movesto-repeal-irs-bank-bailouts--/l ("Rep. Michele Bachmann, R-Minn., is making good on a Tea
Party movement vow to get rid of the new rules and regulations governing Wall Street in what is
commonly known as the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul bill . . . .").
133 See Keith Hennessey, Causes of the Financialand Economic Crisis: Dissenting Statement
of Commissioner 414, available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edulcdn media/fcicreports/fcic_final report hennesseyholtz-akin thomasdissent.pdf ("We . . . reject as too simplistic the hypothesis that too little regulation caused the crisis . . . . Poorly designed government
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of election 2012, at least some Republicans are reportedly arguing that we need
even less regulation. 13 4 However, the point I am making here is that the DoddFrank Corporation is novel and important because it adds something new to the
corporate theory debate-not that it ends the debate.
V. IMPLICATIONS

If it is fair to say that Dodd-Frank's official acknowledgement that at
least some corporations have become TBTF equates to official recognition that
(at least as to some points of the corporate theory debate) concession theory got
it right while the contractarians got it wrong, then we should continue to see
ample opportunity to remind decision-makers of this fact in upcoming cases and
legislative debates. While the Citizens United decision cautions against expecting the corporate theory debate to take center stage automatically, the fact remains that there will be many opportunities to point out that some of our most
pressing economic issues revolve at least in part around the question: "What is a
corporation, and what way of thinking about corporations serves us best?"
Two immediate examples come to mind. First, there is the Supreme
Court case of AT&T v. FCC, wherein the question presented was whether the
Freedom of Information Act's protection of "personal privacy" protects the
"privacy" of corporate entities.
The Court decided the case solely on the basis of statutory construction: "'Person' is a defined term in the statute [expressly
including corporations]; 'personal' is not. When a statute does not define a term,
we typically 'give the phrase its ordinary meaning.' 'Personal' ordinarily refers
to individuals." 36 However, the fact remains that the case simply begs the
question of whether corporations should have personal privacy rights. Wrote
Stephen Bainbridge in response to the decision:
[The opinion contains t]welve pages of what purports to be legal and grammatical analysis . . . . But Chief Justice Roberts

could have summed up his opinion far more succinctly: "Because at least 5 of us say so."

housing policies distorted market outcomes and contributed to the creation of unsound Mortgages
134
Susan Page, 2012 Looms as a Test of Competing Economic Theories, USA TODAY (June 20,
2011, 5:35 AM), available at http://www.usatoday.con/news/politics/2011-06-19-GOP-Obamaeconomy-tax-cuts-spending-cuts-candidatesn.htm ("With the economy swamping other issues
for American voters, Republican contenders have united behind a conservative template that
would reduce the role of government - slashing spending, cutting taxes and reducing regulation .
135
136

131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
Id. at 1182 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1267 (2010)).
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The Citizens United decision last term attracted much criticism
. . . for holding that a corporation is a person and as such has

certain constitutional rights. While I agreed with the holding, I
was disturbed that the Chief Justice's majority opinion for the
Supreme Court so obviously lacked a coherent theory of the nature of the corporation and, as such, also lacked a coherent
theory of what legal rights the corporation possesses.
The utterly specious word games that drive this opinion simply
confirm that Chief Justice Roberts has failed to articulate a
plausible analytical framework for this important problem.13 7
The called-for "plausible analytical framework" seemingly requires the
justices to expressly adopt a particular theory of the corporation. If the preferred theory ultimately turns out to be some version of the nexus-of-contracts
theory, then it will be fair to demand an explanation for why that theory was
favored in light of Dodd-Frank and the apparent failings of contractarianism
embodied in that Act.
A second timely debate that implicates corporate theory is proxy access.
Somewhat ironically, the issue arises directly out of a Dodd-Frank mandate.
Larry Ribstein has argued that the best argument for those opposing proxy
access may well come directly from Citizens United.138 It would be circular
indeed if challenges to proxy access under Dodd-Frank were resolved on the
basis of pro-corporate First Amendment grounds following Citizens United,
when Citizens United arguably embraced a contractarian view of the corporation-the shortcomings of which this Essay asserts gave rise to the need for
Dodd-Frank in the first instance.139
Stephen Bainbridge, Corporations have no right under FOIA to "personal privacy",
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Mar.
1,
2011),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/03/corporations-have-noright-under-foia-to-personal-privacy.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
137

138

See Larry Ribstein, The Securities Laws and the FirstAmendment, TRUTH ON THE MARKET

(Dec. 28, 2010),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/12/28/the-securities-laws-and-the-firstamendment/ (suggesting that after Citizens United the Court will be less inclined to respect distinctions that up till now have been cited to support regulation of corporate speech in areas like
shareholder proposals). Cf Larry Ribstein, The SEC, Global Warming and the FirstAmendment,
IDEOBLOG (Jan. 29, 2010, 6:35 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2010/01/the-secglobal-warming-and-the-first-amendment.html (making similar argument in terms of Citizens
United's impact on the SEC's ability to require corporate disclosures on climate change).
13 As noted above, the SEC's most recently promulgated proxy access rule was indeed successfully challenged in the D.C. Circuit. See Bainbridge supra note 114. However, the basis for
the rejection of the rule was the SEC's failure to conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis, not anything implicating corporate theory like Citizens United did. See Smith, supra note 16. Cf Brett
McDonnell, Dodd-Frank @ 1: An Overall Assessment, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 22, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/dodd-frank-1-an-overall-assessment.html
("[L]et me
briefly lament the D.C. Circuit's vacating of the proxy access rule. . . . The SEC's documents
proposing and finalizing the rule are about extensive as I have ever seen from that agency, and

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011

27

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 8
236

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114

Of course, these are only two examples. Given the dominant role of
corporations in our modem society, however, it should not be too hard to defend
the proposition that many other cases like these-raising, either directly or indirectly, the question of how we should best define corporations-will arise with
great frequency. When they do, we should not forget the message of DoddFrank identified herein: that both its reassertion of government authority over
corporations, and its announcement of the arrival of the too-big-to-fail corporation, constitute two meaningful challenges to the dominance of contractarianism.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that it is not my intent to suggest in
any way that the contractarian view of the firm is never the best way to view the
corporation. In fact, I would argue the exact opposite is true. However, to the
extent that the nexus-of-contracts theory is employed to support what I view as
an extreme emphasis on de-regulation, I believe reports of the death of concession theory, and the concomitant unchallenged dominance of nexus-of-contracts
theory, have been exaggerated. That is to say, concession theory-at least as
I've broadly employed the term here-remains a viable counter-balance to some
of the more pernicious (at least from my perspective) legislative and judicial
pronouncements that are alleged to be natural consequences of nexus-ofcontracts theory. Anecdotally, it is worth mentioning that while nexus-ofcontracts theory has its roots in economics rather than law, it often appears to be
the conservative legal scholars that have raised the banner of the theory in the
name of de-regulation much more frequently than their fellow economists. 14 0
Be that as it may, this Essay is in no way meant to suggest that concession
theory in any form should replace the nexus-of-contracts theory (as if that were
even possible). Rather, the purpose of this Essay is to point out that concession
theory, along with its various anti-contractarian brethren, remains viable and,
more importantly, that Dodd-Frank may well have added a meaningful bit of
spring to its step.
From the perspective of many, change is coming. Lynn Stout has written in a related context:
they had voluminous comments from all sides to help guide them. The D.C. Circuit cherrypicks
areas where it asserts the SEC didn't do enough. It will almost always be possible to do that with
any agency rulemaking. Requiring that level of deliberation could well make the task of rulewriting for Dodd-Frank more daunting still. This opinion is little more than the judges ignoring
the proper judicial rule of deference to an agency involved in notice-and-comment rulemaking and
asserting their own naked political preferences. Talk about judicial activism.").
140
Cf. Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE EcoNOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Edward Elgar, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1754242 (noting discrepancy between corporate law's marginalization of
employees as mere contracting parties, and economic theories of the firm wherein "employees
take on a much more central role").
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[I]n the 1970s . . . [p]rominent members of the ["Chicago
School" of economists] argued that economic analysis could reveal the proper goal of corporate governance quite clearly, and
that goal was to make shareholders as wealthy as possible....
[However,] the shareholder primacy view, as conventionally
understood, has reached its zenith, and is poised for decline.
Traditional shareholder primacy thinking is being rapidly undermined by new developments in economic and corporate
theory; by striking changes in business practice; and by a flood
of recent empirical studies. In its classic form, the shareholdercentered model of the corporation is on the brink of failure. 141
Meanwhile, Charles Whitehead has opined that, "Corporate law's traditional
deference to private ordering has begun to give way to a new understanding of
how shareholders, directors, and officers interact." 42 And Hayden and Bodie
conclude that, "The nexus of contracts model does not represent the reality of
the modem corporation, and it has misled us for too long."l 4 3 As this change
unfolds, we may well point to the arrival of the Dodd-Frank Corporation as the
point at which nexus-of-contracts theory "jumped the shark." t "

Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on 'Shareholder Primacy' (Feb. 21, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1763944.
142
Charles K. Whitehead, Why Not a CEO Term Limit? (Feb. 13, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 760507.
143
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 112, at 16.
1" See Jumping the shark, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jumpingtheshark (last
visited Oct. 12, 2011) (internal citations omitted).
The phrase jump the shark comes from a scene in the fifth season premier episode of the American TV series Happy Days titled "Hollywood: Part 3," written by Fred Fox, Jr. and aired on September 20, 1977. In the episode, the central characters visit Los Angeles, where a water-skiing Fonzie (Henry Winkler), wearing swimming trunks and his leather jacket, jumps over a confined
shark, answering a challenge to demonstrate his bravery. The series continued
for nearly seven years after that, with a number of changes in cast and situations. Jon Hein explained the concept as follows: "It's a moment. A defining
moment when you know that your favorite television program has reached its
peak. That instant that you know from now on...it's all downhill. Some call it
the climax. We call it 'Jumping the Shark.' From that moment on, the program
will simply never be the same."
Id.
141
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